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Abstract
The paper focuses on the choice of forest management strategies for natural haz-
ards by nonindustrial owners, when forest provides nontimber services. We introduce
a basic two-period model where the private owner hedges against natural hazards on
his/her forest thanks to financial strategies (accumulation of savings) or to the adop-
tion of sylvicultural practices. We show that: 1/ the harvesting rule, in the presence of
amenity services and a random growth rate for forest, is smaller than the one predicted
under the Faustmann’s rule; 2/ savings and sylvicultural pratices may be seen as per-
fectly substitutable tools. However, our analysis predicts that, depending on whether
forest owners opt for the financial strategy or undertake sylvicultural practices, the
harvesting rule displays a specific sensitivity to price effects and/or changes in the dis-
tribution of natural hazards.
JEL Classification: D81, Q23, Q54.
Keywords: Risk, Forest, Amenities, Savings and Sylvicultural practices.
Categories: Renewable Resources: Forestry; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk
and Uncertainty, Environmental Economics: Natural Disasters.
∗The authors would like to thank Hippolyte d’Albis, the participants at the annual conference of the
SCSE at Québec (16-17 May 2007), at the 12th Joint Seminar of EALE and Geneva Association at Lecce
(15-16 May 2007) and participants at the 2nd Symposium on Economic Theory, Policy and Application at
Athens (6-7 August 2007) for helpful comments.
†BETA-CNRS and University of Nancy, and LEF UMR INRA/ENGREF; Faculté de Droit, Economie et
Gestion, 13 place Carnot, 54 035 Nancy, France. Marielle.Brunette@univ-nancy2.fr
‡LEF UMR INRA/ENGREF, 14 rue Girardet, 54 042 Nancy, France. couture@nancy-engref.inra.fr
§University of Nancy, UFR Administration Economique et Sociale, 4 rue de la Ravinelle, CO 7026, 54
035 Nancy cedex, France. Eric.Langlais@univ-nancy2.fr
1
1 Introduction
For several years, the frequency and the severity of extreme climatic events have seemed to
increase and they have caused more and more damages in forestry management (Schelhaas
and al., 2003). Climate change may reinforce the traditional damages caused by natural
risks in forest. Recent exceptional events such as forest fires and windstorms in Europe have
focused attention on programs to incite nonindustrial private forest owners to reduce the risk
of damage from natural events. Such natural disasters affect the timber production of forests
and also amenity services one can get from standing stocks of forests. Forests provide a large
variety of nontimber services, such as walk, landscape, mushroom crop, produced jointly with
timber, and vanished with the standing stock and also with natural disasters. Recently it
is proved that nonindustrial private forest owners confer some private value to the amenity
services of forest stock even if there is no financial incentives to these functions (Birch, 1994 ;
Butler and Leatherberry, 2005). This joint production property is now included in the forest
owner’s decision to harvest timber that affects automatically the flow of amenity services.
These amenity relationships reinforce the importance of hedging strategies against natural
risks. Forest owners can undertake risk management activities at the same time of stand
management that are likely to reduce the potential financial losses due to natural disasters.
Such an activity is insurance or savings; another one is sylvicultural practices. However, it
is observed in Europe that forest insurance is an unusual practice and nonindustrial private
forest owners favor sylvicultural practices, principally regeneration of forests, or financial
tools to protect their forests against natural disasters (Picard et al., 2002; Brunette and
Couture, 2006). As a result, understanding nonindustrial private forest owners’ hedging
strategies is important to improve government prevention policy.
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These hedging practices of nonindustrial private forest owners when standing stock has
private value rise many questions. First, how does hedging strategies affect the allocation of
forests into harvesting and amenity service purposes? Second, are these differences in har-
vesting behaviour depending on the hedging strategies selected by the forest owner? Third,
what are the qualitative properties of timber supply and hedging strategies when amenity
services have private value? The aim of this paper is to investigate decision making for
nonindustrial private forest owners in terms of coverage against natural hazards, and thus
to provide a comparative analysis of the alternative advantages produced by two different
hedging strategies: savings versus sylvicultural practices. This paper explores harvesting
and coverage behaviour of nonindustrial private forest owners when they value amenity ser-
vices of forests and when there is uncertainty about biological timber. Despite the absence
of data about the behaviour of hedging strategies, we adopt a normative approach designed
to provide a basic dynamic framework.
The implications of biological risk for nonindustrial private forest owners’ harvesting
behaviour have been studied in many papers in a Faustmann-type framework when forest
owners choose only stand rotation age (Reed, 1984; Reed and Clarke, 1989) and timber
and nontimber services have private value (Englin and al., 2000), and in a framework of a
two-period model (Koskela and Ollikainen, 1999). They, however, considered no coverage
measures. The question of hedging strategies have been subject only to relatively few stud-
ies. Within the Faustmann rotation framework, Reed (1987) and Amacher and al. (2005)
analyzed how optimal rotation is affected by coverage measures which may take the form of
fire protection expenditures and fuel management activities respectively. Reed (1987) does
not consider nontimber benefits, and assume that fire protection only influences the proba-
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bility of fire occurrence. Amacher and al. (2005) consider amenity services. They assume
that nonindustrial forest owners can undertake sylvicultural practices such as intermediate
fuel treatment and varying planting density. They show that, based on simulations, the
standard result that fire reduces the optimal rotation age does not hold when landowners
use fuel management. Indeed, the optimal rotation age rises as fire risk increases. They do
not analyze the financial hedging strategy, and they adopt a Faustmann framework but not
a basic two-period model.
In contrast, in this paper our purpose is to focus on self-coverage activities which may be
used by nonindustrial private forest owners in order to hedge against natural risks; we mainly
consider financial strategies (accumulation of savings) and sylvicultural practices (regenera-
tion of forest). Our paper builds on the literature that has explored self-insurance practices
mostly in a static framework (Ehlrich and Becker, 1972 ; Lee, 1998 ; Jullien and al., 1999).
Although these static works are very helpful to understand agents’ coverage behaviour, they
cannot be used to address our questions that require a simple dynamic framework. The
most important contributions in the literature in this context are by Gollier (2002), Gollier
(2003), and Braun and Koeniger (2007) but they investigate the interaction between market
insurance and accumulation of riskless asset except Gollier (2002). Here we propose, in an
expected utility framework, a dynamic model with two periods to represent harvesting and
hedging behaviour of a forest owner that derives utility from timber revenue and amenities
provided by the standing forests. We assume that he/she is a nonindustrial private forest
owner, in the sense that his/her main earnings do not come from forest harvestings. This is
consistent with, on the one hand, the assumption according to which he/she is risk averse
with respect to natural disasters; on the other hand, the fact that he/she does not buy mar-
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ketable insurance coverage. Such an utility maximization framework with two-period has
been used in many previous papers (Max and Lehman, 1989 ; Hyberg and Holthausen, 1989
; Amacher and Brazee, 1997 ; Koskela and Ollikainen, 1997, 1999) to study forest manage-
ment but not to analyze hedging strategies. The paper extends the earlier analyzes in these
points. It is shown that accumulation of savings and sylvicultural practices may be seen
as perfectly substitutable as hedging strategy by the nonindustrial private forest owners. It
is also shown that the harvesting rule displays a specific sensitivity to price effects and/or
changes in the distribution of natural hazards, depending on whether forest owners opt for
the financial strategy or undertake sylvicultural practices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model
of timber supply when nonindustrial private forest owners value amenity services of forest
stands and there is an uncertainty on production. Each hedging tool is separately studied.
Section 3 derives results about the comparative statics by interpreting the differences between
the two prevention tools. Finally, section 4 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Optimal hedging strategies in a risky context
There are two categories of decision variables given that forest, on the one hand is a pro-
ductive asset for the owner (forest allows the owner to obtain earnings), and on the other
hand, it is a risky asset with an uncertain value in the future (requiring that the forest owner
undertakes protective investments). The first kind of decision variables is associated to the
forest management strategies (harvesting at each date). The second type of decisions linked
to the coverage of risks, is understood either as savings noted s or sylvicultural practices
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noted q.
We consider a nonindustrial private forest owner endowned with an exogenous initial
wealth Y and an even-aged forest with an initial stock Q. The owner is assumed to have
preferences over present and future consumption (c1 and c2) and over present and future
amenity services provided by the forest stands (k1 and k2)1. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that preferences have a representation which is separable (at each date) between
consumptions and amenities, and additively separable accross periods, which write as:
V = u(c1) + v(k1) + δE
[
u(c2) + v(k2)
]
(1)
where δ denotes the discount rate and E the expectation operator, u being the utility value
of consumption (supposed to be increasing and concave), v being the utility value of forest
amenities (being increasing and concave). In order to rule out inessential difficulties, we
assume that v′(k1) = v′(k2) = m > 0. As a result, the assumptions made on u ensure that
the second order conditions are always satisfied.
The existence of the forest stocks ki with i = 1, 2 procures amenity services to the forest
owner. The value of the forest stock in the second period is uncertain because we assume
that forest may be damaged by a natural hazard at the beginning of the second period, for
example forest fire or windstorm. In our framework, this is captured as follows: the physical
gross rate of forest growth γ is a random variable whose realizations belong to the interval
1There is a current substantial interest in evaluating and valuing various services provided by different
ecosystems. Some of these studies deal with the amenity services in the forest sector (Zandersen and Tol
(2003)). There is several methods in order to estimate the value of amenities. For example, the travel cost
method and the contingent valuation one are used to assess tourism and recreation services. For more details
on the methods, see Barbier and al. (1997) and for informations about categories of amenities, see Costanza
and al. (1997).
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]0, γ] with γ > 1.
2.1 Financial strategy
If the forest owner opts for the financial tool in order to protect the forest stand against
the consequences of a natural disaster, the decision variables are the harvesting in the first
period and in the second one, denoted respectively x1 and x2, and the savings s.
The objective of the forest owner is the maximisation of (1) with respect to x1, x2 and s,
under the following relationships for consumption flows and forest stocks:
c1 = Y + p1x1 − s (2)
k1 = Q− x1 (3)
c2 = p2x2 +Rs (4)
k2 = γk1 − x2 (5)
The equations (3) and (5) give the joint production of timber and amenities. By choosing
current harvesting of the initial forest stand Q, the forest owner defines also k1. This re-
maining stock will grow according to the stochastic growth rate γ. The choice of the second
period harvesting x2 determines also the future forest stock k2 which gives terminal amenity
services.
We consider that the timber price at date i is denoted by pi with i = 1, 2 and R = (1 + r)
where r denotes the net interest rate on the capital market. Then the two equations (2)
and (4) deal with the forest owner’s consumption and savings decisions. In the first period,
the consumption is defined by the sum of the initial wealth and the revenue from harvesting
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minus the savings. During the first period, the forest owner allocates the total revenue be-
tween current consumption and savings. In the second period, the consumption represents
the sum of the revenue from harvesting and the capital income plus savings.
For an interior solution, the optimal first and second period harvesting (x1∗s, x2∗s), and
the optimal accumulation of savings (s∗), are given by the following first order conditions:
p1u
′(c1∗s)−m(1 + δE[γ]) = 0 (6)
p2u
′(c2∗s)−m = 0 (7)
−u′(c1∗s) + δRu′(c2∗s) = 0 (8)
with c1∗s (c2∗s) corresponding to the optimal first (second) period consumption and k1∗s (k2∗s)
representing the optimal timber stock at the first (second) period.
The equation (6) means that the optimal first period consumption (which is controled thanks
to the optimal level of harvesting in first period) is reached when the marginal benefit of
this consumption expressed in utility terms, p1u′(c1∗s), is equal to its marginal cost (which
is constant) m(1 + δE[γ]). Remark that this marginal cost can be divided in two terms.
The first effect comes from the existence of a tradeoff between consumption and amenity
services in the first period: an increase in x1 allows to increase the first period consumption
but reduces the first period stock k1, such as the value of amenity services decreases at a
constant rate m. The second effect is explainable in terms of intertemporal substitution
effects: the increase of x1 reduces, all else held equal, the second period value of the forest
stock k2, and thus decreases the second period value of amenity services.
The first order condition (7) determines c2∗s (which is now controled thanks to the optimal
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level of harvesting in second period) by equating the marginal benefit of harvestings expressed
in utility terms p2u′(c2∗s) and their marginal cost m.
Finally, the condition (8) means that the optimal savings is obtained when the marginal
benefit of savings, expressed in utility terms, δRu′(c2∗s) is equal to its marginal cost (also in
utility terms) u′(c1∗s). Remark that (8) can be rewritten as follows:
u′(c1∗s)
u′(c2∗s)
= δR (9)
This expression means that the optimal savings is reached when the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between consumptions is equal to the return of savings, which is a condition well-known
in the literature on consumption/savings decision.
Mixing the first order conditions (6), (7) and (8), allows us to obtain the fundamen-
tal intertemporal harvesting rule, for current harvest, defined by:
p1
p2
δR = 1 + δE[γ] (10)
Condition (10) may be understood as the Faustmann’s rule (1849) which is a result well-
known in the literature on forestry management. The Faustmann’s rule, which is written as
p1R = p2E[γ], states that at the optimal cut period, the forest owner is indifferent between
harvesting in the first period and saving the revenue, and harvesting in the second period.
Thus several comments can be made on the basis of equation (10). On the one hand, to the
extent that it relies on exogenous parameters of the model, it is a necessary condition for
an interior equilibrium to exist; more specifically, the interior equilibrium in our model is
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supported by the condition that p1
p2
R − E[γ] > 0, i.e. the real interest rate must exceed the
expected growth rate of forest. It implies that, when amenity services are introduced (given
that v′(.) = m, the uncertainty on γ has no influence on this result), the level of harvesting
in the first period is smaller than the one predicted by the Faustmann’s rule.
2.2 Sylvicultural Practices
The sylvicultural practices consist, for the forest owner, in a regeneration of a part of the
forest in the first period. This regenerated part of the forest procures an outcome only in the
second period - the implicit assumption is that the young plantations produce no financial
and no ecological value as soon as they have not yet reached a sufficient size which occurs
only in the second period. The investment in the regeneration process will be represented
through a constitution cost at the first period, denoted cq where c is the marginal cost (let
us assume it is constant), and q represents the amount of the stock of regenerated trees (for
example, a physical reserve of trees) choosen by the forest owner.
To the extent that the forest owner opts, now, for the sylvicultural practices (rather than
for the accumulation of savings) the decision variables are the harvesting in the first and in
the second period, denoted respectively x1 and x2, and the stock of regeneration q.
The objective of the forest owner is the maximisation of (1) with respect to x1, x2 and q
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and under the following relationships:
c1 = Y + p1x1 − cq (11)
k1 = Q− x1 (12)
c2 = p2x2 (13)
k2 = γk1 + q − x2 (14)
The cost of the sylvicultural practices is deducted from the initial wealth Y plus the revenue
of the first period harvesting p1x1. The forest stock in the first period k1 is the same what-
ever the coverage strategy adopted by the forest owner. We can see that the sylvicultural
practices act on the forest stock of the second period by increasing it, whereas, as we have
seen previously, the savings acts on the consumption of the second period by increasing it.
Thus the forest owner removes cq to the first period consumption to set up a stock of regen-
eration which increases the forest stock in the second period.
Once more, the optimal first and second period harvesting (x1∗q, x2∗q), and the optimal
stock of regeneration (q∗), are determined, for an interior solution, through the following
first order conditions :
p1u
′(c1∗q)−m(1 + δE[γ]) = 0 (15)
p2u
′(c2∗q)−m = 0 (16)
−cu′(c1∗q) + δm = 0 (17)
with c1∗q (c2∗q) corresponding to the optimal first (second) period consumption and k1∗q (k2∗q)
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representing the optimal timber stock at the first (second) period.
The conditions (15) and (16) are the same as the ones (6) and (7). The condition (17) means
that the optimal stock of regeneration is reached when the actual value of the marginal benefit
of this stock (which is constant) δm is equal to its marginal cost cu′(c1∗q) (expressed in utility
terms).
Using (16) and (17), we have the following simplified condition:
u′(c1∗q)
u′(c2∗q)
= δ
p2
c
(18)
This expression means that the equilibrium value for q is reached when the rate of return of
sylvicultural practices is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumptions at
each date. This also shows that sylvicultural practices mimic the functionning of financial
markets and the accumulation of savings, in the sense that they play the role of a technology
of intertemporal transfers of ressources: the forest owner has the opportunity to choose a
consumption path along which the rate of return of the physical asset equals his/her personal
marginal rate of intertemporal substitution.
Finally, mixing the three conditions (15), (16) and (17) enables us to characterize the
optimal harvesting rule as follows:
δ
p1
c
= 1 + δE[γ] (19)
This last equation (19) leads to the same qualitative results as those suggested for the condi-
tion (10): thus the similar comments apply as regard to the role of uncertainty and amenity
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services.
Finally, comparing (8) to (17) and (10) to (19) suggest the following fundamental result:
Proposition 1: Consider an economy (its basic parameters are p1, p2, δ), where forest
owners have access to perfect financial markets paying a non risky (gross) rate of interest
denoted R in order to manage natural hazards associated to the random growth rate of forest
γ. Then, there always exists an alternative economy (with the same basic parameters and
natural hazards) where forest owners invest in costly sylvicultural practices (the marginal cost
being c) which enable them to regenerate a part of their forest, such as forest owners have
the same intertemporal consumption rule and adopt the same harvesting rule.
The intuition of this “equivalence theorem” is obvious, coming back to (17): consider that
p2
c
= R, meaning that the gross interest rate of savings is equal to the rate of return of sylvi-
cultural practices - (8) and (17) are thus identical, implying that, whatever the instrument
at the disposal of forest owners to manage natural hazards, they will be induce to choose
the same intertemporal consumption rule. By the same token, if p2
c
= R, then (10) and
(19) are identical, meaning that in both economies, forest owners also undertake the same
harvesting activities. Consequently , as soon as p2
c
= R, savings and sylvicultural practices
are perfectly substitutable tools. In other words, p2
c
= R implies that the forest owner is
indifferent between accumulation of savings or the use of sylvicultural practices in order to
protect his/her forest against natural hazards. Therefore we did not address the issue of the
joint use of savings and sylvicultural practices because, if p2
c
6= R, they are no more perfectly
substitutable and so (given that uncertainty bears only on γ) forest owners will use the most
efficient or less costly tool. For example, when R > p2
c
, forest owners will accumulate savings
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while when p2
c
> R, owners will invest in sylvicultural practices.
3 Analytics of timber supply under risk and multiple-use
of forests
This section develops the comparative statics of the model, for both instruments of risk
management. Although the savings and the sylvicultural practices may be seen as perfectly
substitutable tools (proposition 1), the harvesting rules in the two cases have a different
sensitivity to the parameters of the model, especially to price shocks and to a shift in risk2.
The comparative statics results are divided in four categories. The first one deals with the
impact of an increase in initial wealth or initial forest stock on the three decision variables for
both savings and sylvicultural practices. The second one bears on the effect of a rise in the
timber prices on the forest owner’s hedging strategies. The third category takes an interest
in the effect of an increase in the savings rate for the savings case and in the marginal cost
of the regeneration process for the sylvicultural practices one. The last category deals with
the effect of an increase in the expected forest growth rate on the decision variables for both
instruments (an increase in E(γ) may be the result of a first or second stochastic dominance
shift in the probability distribution of γ). Now, we analyse with more details each of these
categories.
3.1 Change in initial wealth and initial forest stock
RESULT 1. For both the financial strategy and the sylvicultural practices an increase in the
initial wealth Y or in the initial forest stock Q has no effect.
2Derivations of all the following results are available from the authors upon request.
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The model predicts that stock variables, Y and Q have no impact on the decision variables for
both instruments, but this result is not a surprise because it is explainable by our assumption
of a constant marginal utility for amenity services which implies risk neutrality to forest
growth risk.
3.2 Change in timber prices
RESULT 2.
A) Financial strategy : i) an increase in p1 leads to a rise in current harvesting and savings
and to a decrease in the future harvesting. ii) an increase in p2 leads to a rise in the future
harvesting and to a decrease in current harvesting and savings.
B) Sylvicultural practices : i) an increase in p1 generates a rise in current harvesting and
sylvicultural practices while it has no effect on the future harvesting. ii) an increase in p2
has no effect.
Given that the model captures no stock effect (wealth effect), it is not surprising to find that
a change in a price entails only a pure substitution effect.
For the savings context, as the timber price in the first period increases, the forest owner
rises the harvesting in order to have a more important return. This larger return obtained
at the end of the first period allows the owner to diminish the second period harvesting
while maintaining the consumption of the second period constant. As a result, the amenity
services provided by the forest stock in the second period increase. Moreover, a rise in p1
pushes the owner to increase the savings.
For the sylvicultural practices context, from (16), we observe that p1 has no effect on c2 and
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thus no one on x2. Nevertheless, as the timber price in the first period increases, the first
period return increases too and by rising x1, the forest owner can face to higher regeneration
costs and can increase his/her sylvicultural practices.
For the savings case, a rise in p2 decreases x1 and s while it rises x2. Actually, as p2
increases, the forest owner lowers the first period harvesting in order to harvest more in the
second period and to have a higher return. However, we observe that an increase in the
second period timber price encourages the forest owner to decrease the savings.
For the sylvicultural practices case, we see that from equations (13) and (16), the forest
owner can increase the consumption of the second period, when p2 rises, without any change
in x2. Moreover, from (15), we note that c1 is independent of p2 and as the marginal utility
of amenity services is constant, the forest owner has no incentives to change k1 and k2 so
that when the timber price in the second period increases, the only one effect is a rise in c2.
3.3 Change in the parameters of hedging strategies
RESULT 3.
A) Financial strategy: an increase in R leads to a rise in current harvesting and savings and
to a decrease in the future harvesting.
B) Sylvicultural practices: an increase in c generates a decrease in current harvesting and
sylvicultural practices while it has no effect on future harvesting.
Facing an increase in R, we note the presence of a pure substitution effect. Therefore, as
the rate of return on savings rises, the forest owner increases the first period harvesting
so as to save more and to have more money in the second period. This larger amount of
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money allows the forest owner to reduce the harvesting in the second period while keeping
the consumption of the second period constant. Moreover, as x2 decreases, the forest stock
in the second period rises and the amenities too. We also observe that an increase in R leads
the forest owner to increase his/her savings in order to be wealthier.
As the marginal cost of the regeneration process increases, the forest owner diminishes q,
i.e the stock of the regenerated trees, because it becomes more and more expensive for the
owner to regenerate a part of his/her forest.
3.4 Change in the expected forest growth rate
RESULT 4.
A) Financial strategy: an increase in E(γ) leads to an increase in the future harvesting and
to a decrease in current harvesting and savings.
B) Sylvicultural practices: an increase in E(γ) generates a decrease in current harvesting
and sylvicultural practices and has no effect on future harvesting.
We observe that for the savings case, an increase in E(γ) rises the second period harvesting
and reduces the first period harvesting and the savings. Therefore, from (6) we observe
that if E(γ) increases, the marginal cost of the first period harvesting rises so that the forest
owner lowers x1. The impact of an increase in E(γ) on x2 can be explained by two conflicting
effects. The first one generates a decrease in x2. In this case, the forest owner does not need
to increase x2 because, as the expected forest growth rate rises, his/her consumption in the
second period increases. The second effect implies an increase in the second period harvest-
ing. Indeed, the forest owner rises x2 jointly to the increase in E(γ) so as to increase his/her
consumption in the second period. Thus, as an increase in E(γ) generates an increase in x2,
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we can notice that the second effect dominates. Finally, in the first period, the forest owner,
anticipating an increase in E(γ), reduces his/her savings because as E(γ) rises, he/she can
satisfy a higher consumption in the second period with less savings.
For the sylvicultural practices case, an increase in the expected forest growth rate reduces
the first period harvesting and the regenerated trees while it has a null impact on the second
period harvesting. From (15), we note that an increase in E(γ) implies a rise in the marginal
cost of the first period harvesting. This result leads the forest owner to decrease the first
period harvesting. The impact of an increase in E(γ) on x2 can be explained by the two
conflicting effects previously mentionned. In this case, we observe that an increase in the
expected forest growth rate has no impact on x2, meaning that the two effects offset each
other. In the end, the decrease in q due to a rise in E(γ) can be explained as follows: the
owner needs a less important stock of regenerated trees when the expected forest growth
increases because the rise in E(γ) ensures the forest owner a larger stock of trees in the
second period.
In order to conclude (see Table 1 where is reported all previous comparative statics
results), we observe that harvesting rules for the two risk management instruments have not
the same sensitivity to price shocks and, to some extent, to risk shock.
4 Concluding Comments
In this article, we develop a dynamic theoretical model in order to analyse the forest owner’s
behaviour in a risky forest management. We compare two coverage activities that the for-
est owner can undertake to protect the forest against natural hazards, the savings and the
18
sylvicultural practices. In this work, there is several contributions. First, we develop the
comparative statics of harvesting and hedging strategies by studying the effect of each pa-
rameter on the optimal decisions. Second, we compare two different hedging strategies in
terms of harvesting when forest owners value amenity services of forest. Third, our approach
is original in the sense that the risk bears on the forest growth rate while it usually bears
on future timber price. Finally, we analyse the savings in a context where the financial tools
are more and more considered in order to cover the important risk. In this framework, we
demonstrate that, the harvesting rule, in the presence of amenity services and a random
growth rate for forest, is smaller than the one predicted under the Faustmann’s rule. We
also show that under some assumptions, accumulation of savings and sylvicultural practices
may be seen as perfectly substitutable for the forest owners. Finally, we show that the har-
vesting rule displays a specific sensitivity to price effects and/or changes in the distribution
of natural hazards, depending on whether forest owners opt for the financial strategy or
undertake sylvicultural practices.
Several extensions are worth to be discussed for this research. First, our assumption of a
constant marginal utility for amenity services could be seen as a limit of this paper. In fact,
our result can be easily generalized assuming that v has a Constant Absolute Risk Aversion
specification - given that wealth effects are also neutralized under the CARA assumption.
Moreover, the same results still hold when we consider that v displays Decreasing Absolute
Risk Aversion : in this last case, it is well-known in the literature that the pure substitution
effects exhibited in our paper are amplified by the wealth effects. However, in the opposite
case where v satisfies the Increasing Absolute Risk Aversion assumption, we know that we
can expect to obtain ambiguous results since pure substitution effects and wealth effects
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have opposite signs.
Nevertheless, each of these alternative assumptions for v is consistent with the central
result of the paper (proposition 1). This one cannot be challenged without introducing
some frictions or imperfections in the model. For example, the basic two-period model we
use implies that both financial decisions (savings) and sylvicultural pratices are held for the
same (short term) horizon. However, due to imperfections in the financial markets on the one
hand (asymmetrical information, borrowing constraints, different interest rates for lenders
and borrowers), and on the other hand, given the existence of a natural delay between the
plantation of the trees and their harvesting, the horizon of decisions in financial markets
may be shorter than for decisions connected to the sylvicultural practices. Moreover, the
production process in forestry may be more or less lengthy, depending on the choice of
trees species. Remark that our analysis is still relevant for forests having a unique specie
and/or homogenous trees in age, at least in the absence of financial imperfections. But
more generally, dealing with market imperfections and non homogenous stands in forestry
would require to introduce a n-period model. In such a framework, financial strategies and
sylvicultural practices should appear as no more perfectly substitutable, and the study of
the optimal mix of both instruments would become a relevant issue. In the same spirit, a last
extension consists in the possibility for the forest owners to learn the state of the world (to
gather informations on the weather, and thus on γ). We can expect that when information
has a positive value, it will be used by forest owners in order to plan both their harvesting
decisions and their risk management decisions. These important extensions are left out for
future researches.
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Table 1: Comparative statics results
Savings Sylvicultural practices
x∗1s x
∗
2s s
∗ x∗1q x
∗
2q q
∗
Initial wealth Y 0 0 0 0 0 0
Initial forest stock Q 0 0 0 0 0 0
Timber price at first period p1 + − + + 0 +
Timber price at second period p2 − + − 0 0 0
Rate of return on savings R + − +
Cost of sylvicultural practices c − 0 −
Expected forest growth rate E(γ) − + − − 0 −
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